This article begins with an assessment of an elderly wildlife-related treaty, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973 (CITES), and explains both how the convention was originally designed and how its Parties managed to develop it in innovative ways not envisaged by the original drafters. The article then turns to an assessment of the effectiveness of the convention in the modern world, and how an enforcement regime based on trade embargoes has been developed. This success, at least measured by indicators such as length of time it takes for states subject to sanctions to fall back into compliance, aside, the article then proceeds to question effectiveness as measured by indicators with less 'high face validity'. Through close analysis of the history of trade embargoes, it is demonstrated that by and large it is developing countries that have been the subjects of sanctions under CITES. In view of recent enforcement issues (illustrated by current whaling in the North Pacific), the article concludes by highlighting the quality of trust which, it is argued, is a critical requirement that must underpin the international regime if there is to be true legitimacy and, ultimately, credibility.
INTRODUCTION
Let me start -as any dyed-in-the-wool environmentalist must -with an alarming bit of news: According to Harvard biologist Edward Wilson, we can now put the fraction of species disappearing each year 'at upward of a thousand times the rate that existed before the coming of humans'.
1 And at the recent World Conservation Congress of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in Hawaii, in September 2016, he predicted that half of the species described by scientists today will be gone by the end of this century, unless we take drastic action.
Wilson's bold and radical suggestion for a 'global solution to extinction' would be to set aside no less than half of the Earth's habitats (land and sea areas), and thereby preserve about 84 per cent of all living species.
2 That of course is a tall order, considering that at present only some 15 per cent of the world's land and less than three per cent of the oceans are legally protected. 3 Although Resolution 6.050 of the IUCN World Conservation Congress called for a 30 per cent global target for marine reserves, even that was considered unrealistic by key countries like China, Japan and South Africa. 4 So in spite of the laudable recent designation of several large marine protected areas (by Australia, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others), the 'Half-Earth' goal may remain a mirage, and certainly does not acquit us from the duty to make the fullest possible use of other available instruments against the threat of extinction.
There is indeed quite a volume of existing international law in this field. On the one hand, there are 'area-based' conservation accords -first proposed more than a hundred years ago in US President Theodore Roosevelt's (unsuccessful) project of a 'Hague Peace Conference on Nature Conservation' in 1909, 5 and the 1991 Madrid Protocol for the Antarctic. 10 On the other hand, there is a wide range of 'species-based' agreements -from the historical bilateral and regional treaties for fisheries, seals, polar bears and migratory birds, 11 to the more recent specific agreements concluded under the 1979 Bonn Convention on Migratory Species. 12 How effective, then, have these global and regional treaties been 'on the ground'? I shall try to answer this question by analyzing the experience of what is perhaps the most prominent among the species agreements: the 1973 Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 13 ratified by Australia with effect from 27 October 1976. First, I propose to take a look at the institutional evolution of the CITES regime over the past 40 years (Ed Couzens aptly calls it an 'old watchdog');
14 second, at some of its quite remarkable innovations in international treaty practice; and to conclude with a cautionary note on future perspectives, in light of the most recent meeting of its 'Conference of the Parties' (CoP17) held in Johannesburg/South Africa from September to October of 2016. 15 2 EVOLUTION OF A TREATY REGIME CITES currently has a near-universal membership of 182 contracting States. 16 It has been described by some as 'perhaps the most successful of all international treaties concerned with the conservation of wildlife '; 17 although that view is challenged by 22 What is beyond dispute is the fact that the practical experience with CITES has indeed provided useful lessons, and in some instances a role model, for other environmental agreements and possibly for the development of modern international environmental law in general.
23
At the time of its adoption, the Washington Convention was -somewhat hyperbolically -hailed by conservationists as the 'Magna Carta for Wildlife'; 24 and it continues to be abbreviated -somewhat inaccurately -as 'the Endangered Species Convention'. Yet, CITES is definitely not a general-purpose wildlife management treaty. As it stands, it is but one component of the existing patchwork of global and regional regimes for wild animal and plant species, 'laser-focused' 25 on the single instrument of international environmental law in force'); P On the other hand, the London Convention may be said to have taught the drafters of CITES an important warning lesson to begin with: As an orthodox ad hoc diplomatic instrument, the old treaty had not provided for future intergovernmental decisionmaking or governing institutions, and after two unsuccessful subsequent attempts at adjusting it to changing circumstances (by way of 'technical conferences' in London 1938 and Bukavu 1953) was eventually overtaken by the political events of de-colonization. 29 Similarly, two regional agreements, which also envisaged trade controls for endangered species but failed to provide the necessary institutional arrangements for implementation, 30 had remained 'sleeping treaties'.
31
In light of that sobering historical experience, the authors of the new drafts elaborated between 1967 and 1973 32 opted for an approach that has been described as 'institutionalizing normative diplomacy ', 33 in the form of a 'dynamic international regime', 34 with a view to facilitating both the periodic updating of agreed standards (especially the lists of protected species appended to the treaty) and the adoption of agreed implementation measures without requiring renewed ratification.
Among the models for this flexible system of treaty adjustment were provisions to simplify the amendment of 'technical annexes' for the international management of marine living resources (including the 'schedule' of the 1946 Whaling Convention); 35 for the 'black lists' and 'gray lists' of prohibited or controlled substances in the field of ocean pollution (eg, under the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention); 36 and for the listing of internationally protected areas (as under the 1972 World Heritage Convention).
37 Also 'borrowed' from the whaling regime was the opt-out procedure of CITES Articles XV, XVI and XXIII, which allows dissenting States to enter specific reservations to the listing of species, yet without blocking the rapid amendment of the lists by majority decision.
38
A number of further adjustments were subsequently introduced -without formal amendment -by consensus or qualified majority decisions of the Contracting Parties, in the form of textual correction, authentic interpretation or temporary suspension of treaty rules. 39 This continuous 'evolutionary' process has not been uncontested. Rev. CoP15, 1985 ), 5.11 (1985 ), 6.7 (1987 ), 11.11 (Rev. CoP15, 2000 ), 13.6 (Rev. CoP16, 2004 /2013 ), 14.6 (Rev. CoP16, 2007 /2013 ), and 16.10 (2013 ; and the tolerated 'sustainable' national export quota for species globally listed on Appendix I, an exception not originally foreseen by the Convention but established by Resolutions Conf. 9.21 (Rev. CoP13, 1994 ) and 14.7 (Rev. CoP15, 2007 On the one hand, there was the controversial practice of controlled auction sales for legally-held ivory stocks; 41 on the other, there is the equally controversial recent practice of several governments to organize the public burning of those stocks, in desperate reaction to the growing threat of poaching and illegal trafficking.
42
The governing body in charge of the dynamic adaptation of the Convention to changing circumstances is the Conference of the Parties (CoP), now meeting every three years, with an elected Standing Committee (SC) acting during the intervals. 43 The permanent institutional structure so established goes far beyond traditional treaty law and may be ranked as a 'comparatively autonomous sectoral legal system'. , to list all elephant species in Appendix I as non-tradeable, failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority due to lack of support from the EU delegation; voting records in CoP17 Inf. 93 (2016 Yet, the historical and geographical background in 1933 had been entirely different. The contracting parties at that time were colonial powers, whose sovereign territories included both the areas of origin and the areas of consumption of the natural resources 55. 'States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies…'; UN General Assembly Resolution 2294 (XXVII), 11 ILM 1416 (emphasis added). See also Art 3 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity adopted at Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, and its preamble: 'Reaffirming that States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources' (emphasis added). 56. 'Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora'; above n 12 (emphasis added). 57. Above (n 28) Art 9(6): 'All trophies of animals found dead, or accidentally killed, or killed in defence of any person, shall, in principle, be the property of the Government of the territory concerned' (emphasis added).
International protection of endangered species in the face of wildlife trade 13 concerned. 58 Hence the enactment and implementation of the necessary hunting, harvesting and customs controls merely required a partial harmonization of their national colonial policies and regulations. 59 That situation changed radically in the wake of decolonization after the Second World War. From now on, two 'camps' of independent States confronted each other as producers and consumers of the resources at stake; 60 and sovereign rights of access and control became part of the North-South debate over a New Economic Order, under the slogan of 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources '. 61 In this context, a definition in Article I(b) of the Convention is important: While any individual 'specimen' of a protected species is subject to the sovereign control of the State concerned, 62 that does not apply to the 'species' itself; ie, the abstract biological genotype to which the specimen belongs. Hence species that are internationally listed as endangered may very well be viewed as (non-renewable) common resources.
63 Accordingly, State authorities apply the treaty not only by virtue of their own sovereign powers over the specimens or populations of animals or plants concerned, but act at the same time as agents or trustees mandated by the international community to protect the species as a whole. 64 This dual function of national authorities has indeed been described as a kind of role-splitting ('dédoublement fonctionnel', in Georges Scelle's celebrated term). 65 In fact, the CITES regime operates on the basis of mutual recognition of national administrative acts (export/import permits, captive breeding or ranching certificates, etc), issued in accordance with agreed How effective, then, has this system been in practice? 'Effectiveness' of course is a notoriously elusive concept, meaning different things to lawyers, economists and political scientists.
66 So let me start out with a personal memory, from the days when I began to work as the first Secretary-General of CITES, at Morges/Switzerland in the 1970s.
67
One of our early ways of verifying governmental compliance with CITES was the 'cactus test' -originally thought up by John A Burton, one of the co-founders of TRAFFIC ('Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce').
68 Why cactus? All wild cactus plants (Cactaceae spp) are listed on Appendix II of CITES, and hence require an export permit to travel abroad, or suitable proof that they are exempt, eg as artificially propagated specimens. So we went into a department store in Morges, and for five Swiss francs acquired a pretty red-flowered cactus advertised as 'Little Red Riding Hood'. From then on, whenever a CITES staff member went on duty travel, he/she had to take the cactus along. Upon arrival at any destination airport in a CITES member country, he/she would proceed through the red entry gate -instead of the green 'nothing-to-declare' entrance -and innocently ask the customs officer whether and how this plant, purchased in Switzerland, should be declared for import.
The reactions at most airports were amazing, and often hilarious. In those days, very few customs inspectors had ever heard of CITES, let alone that their government had ratified the treaty and regularly reported that it was in full compliance with its terms. Their usual reaction was to consult the applicable code of the Customs Cooperation Council (now the World Customs Organisation), define the cactus as 'noncommercial import of an ornamental plant', and wave the nosy passenger on. When the passenger insisted on a document, they would either grab some form and stamp it -we built up the most peculiar collection of so-called import documents -or come up with highly ingenuous authoritative explanations why no form was required in this particular case.
Others would proceed to a phytosanitary inspection, including the occasional fumigation -one customs officer at Copenhagen airport informed me that he was far more concerned about the earth in the flowerpot than about the cactus, and returned Little Red Riding Hood naked, without her pot. Once, when travelling to the 1978 IUCN General Assembly in Ashkhabad with other staff members and walking through the red gate at Moscow airport (even though the others had implored me not to do it lest we all end up in a gulag), I was kept in custody for an hour until the competent official showed up and allowed me, exceptionally, to move on with the cactus, in the interest of international ecological cooperation and in order not to miss my connecting flight.
In each case, the cactus-bearing staff member had to write a full report on his/her experience, for transmission and follow-up action to the national CITES authority concerned. As time went by, more and more customs services did become familiar with the Convention, and many international airports became cactus-proof or at least cactuswise. Yet any customs officer who then proudly produced a copy of the treaty text, plus the appropriate form, still faced the problem of identifying the specimen at hand. He/she would study the plant intently, ask for her name, enter 'Little Red Riding Hood' in the column for species nomenclature, perhaps declare her exempt as a household item, and mumble something about the new green bureaucracy. One obvious risk was to hit upon the same embarrassed customs inspector twice in a row -as happened to me at my hometown airport in Munich: What that Bavarian customs officer asked me to do with that cactus (in the native Bavarian dialect) is unfit for print, and therefore could not be fully included in my report to the national CITES authority.
Those of course were the early days of CITES. The secretariat's cooperation with customs services has since evolved worldwide. Under a 1996 Memorandum of Understanding with the World Customs Organization (WCO), 69 the WCO 'harmonized system' of standard tariff classifications for import/export has been aligned with CITES documentation requirements; joint training and capacity-building programmes now support customs administrations in dealing with illegal wildlife trade. 70 Moreover, in stark contrast to former years, membership of the Convention is now near-universal, leaving virtually no loopholes for 'free-riding' by non-member countries which until the 1990s had served as lucrative trade havens outside the CITES regime. 71 In this regard, Article X requiring 'comparable' documentation also for trade with third-party States ultimately proved effective in inducing the 'hold-outs' to join, thus turning free-riders into 'forced riders'.
72
Today instead, the genuine free-riders are Member States that fail to comply with their obligations under the Convention, and exploit the resulting inequality of trading standards to their own competitive advantage. 73 In response, the CoP developed since 1992 a list of basic criteria for domestic implementing legislation that must be met by all Member States in order to satisfy the treaty's requirements: (i) designation of national CITES management and scientific authorities; (ii) prohibition of trade in violation of the Convention; (iii) penalization of such trade; and (iv) confiscation of illegally traded or illegally possessed specimens. 74 States are periodically grouped in one of three categories: (1) meeting all four requirements; (2) meeting only some of the requirements; or (3) not meeting the requirements. 75 Given that some at least of the compliance deficits so identified are attributable to problems of administrative capacity -especially in countries lacking the necessary infrastructure in this field 76 -the Conference initiated a 'carrot and stick' strategy with regard to States ranked in categories 2 and 3. On the one hand, externally funded technical and financial assistance is provided for training and capacity-building, 77 including specific projects financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 78 On the other hand, the CoP has since 1985 developed a unique scheme of 'collective retorsion' to sanction persistent non-compliance by States, 79 While a suspension may thus focus on trade in particular species only ('species-specific'), the most effective sanctions of course are general embargoes ('country-specific'); ie, denying recognition to all CITES export permits issued by the targeted country as valid documentation for entry anywhere else in the world. As a result, the country is excluded from access to the lucrative legal export markets for some 35,000 species of commercially tradable wildlife and wildlife products listed in Appendix II of the Convention. In view of the economic stakes involved, therefore, the mere threat of an embargo often tends to produce near-instant compliance. 81 Over the past 30 years, general (country-specific) CITES embargoes have been imposed in more than a hundred cases, in the form of collective trade suspensions targeting 60 countries at one time or another (some more than once), as shown in The extraordinary effectiveness of the scheme is demonstrated by the fact that in more than 80 per cent of the cases, trade suspensions could be lifted within less than a year, on the basis of evidence that the targeted country had returned to compliance (by enacting or amending the necessary legislation, submitting overdue reports, or complying with action plan requirements). 86 A comparative United Nations University study on trade impacts of multilateral environmental agreements credits CITES embargoes with 'an almost 100 per cent success rate'. 87 Even in cases where recommended trade bans were not implemented by all Member States, 88 denial of market access in a few key countries usually proved sufficient to induce compliance. The formal legal basis for these trade suspensions is Article XIV(1)(a) of the Convention, which expressly reserves the right of States to take 'stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession of transport of specimens of species included in appendices I,II and III, or the complete prohibition thereof' (emphasis added). Implicitly, therefore, the Article also authorizes the use of unilateral or multilateral economic sanctions by way of trade bans against other States, provided such measures are compatible with applicable general rules of international law.
89 Embargoes have not only been imposed on parties to the Convention, but also on nonparty States failing to comply with 'comparable' documentation standards under Article X ('trade with States not party to the Convention').
90
Surprisingly perhaps, CITES practice in this field seems to have gone virtually unnoticed in most of the general literature of international law. In their seminal 1995 study on The New Sovereignty, Abram and Antonia Chayes claimed that 'sanctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used'; 91 and in 2001 the UN International Law Commission concluded that 'such cases are controversial and the practice is embryonic'. 92 At the ripe age of 30, the CITES embargo certainly is a portly embryo. And even though there were initial concerns over potential conflicts with the world trade regime, 93 multilateral CITES trade suspensions are now generally considered compatible with GATT Article XX, 94 and their legality has never formally been contested in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 95 4 OUTLOOK: THE CHALLENGE OF LEGITIMACY Quite apart, however, from the normative legality and the practical effectiveness of the CITES compliance procedures, the question remains whether this unique system also meets other criteria which an international regulatory regime must take into account if it expects to remain accepted and sustainable in the long run. It has indeed been pointed out that 'the viability of the "regulatory phenomenon" is linked to a major challenge: that of its legitimacy'. 96 Legitimacy in this context may be defined in procedural terms of fairness, 97 and in empirical/sociological terms of equitable outcomes. 98 Yet, the statistical evidence of CITES trade sanctions over the past three decades reveals a rather perplexing North-South imbalance. As Table 1 shows, no less than 95 per cent of the States targeted by all-out trade embargoes were developing countries.
99
Even though inadequate implementation of the Convention is undoubtedly often caused by a lack of administrative and financial capacities in the Third World, 100 to find sanctionable compliance deficits almost exclusively in the South comes as something of an empirical surprise. Critics have not hesitated to attribute these findings to a hidden neocolonial bias of the regime. 101 Past 'infraction reports' by the CITES Secretariat and by
